Abstract-A combined base station association and power control problem is studied for the uplink of multichannel multicell cellular networks, in which each channel is used by exactly one cell (i.e., base station). A distributed association and power update algorithm is proposed and shown to converge to a Nash equilibrium of a noncooperative game. We consider network models with discrete mobiles (yielding an atomic congestion game), as well as a continuum of mobiles (yielding a population game). We find that the equilibria need not be Pareto efficient, nor need they be system optimal. To address the lack of system optimality, we propose pricing mechanisms. It is shown that these mechanisms can be implemented in a distributed fashion.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS communication systems have experienced tremendous growth over the last decade, and this growth continues unabated worldwide. Efficient management of resources is essential for the success of wireless cellular systems. In a mobile cellular system, mobiles adapt to time varying radio channels by adjusting base station (BS) associations and by controlling transmitter powers. Doing so, they not only maintain their quality of service (QoS) but also enhance their transmitters' battery lives. In addition, such controls reduce the network interference, thus maximizing spatial spectrum reuse. Distributed control is of special interest, since the alternative of centrally orchestrated control involves added infrastructure, the need for distribution of measurements, and hence system complexity.
Distributed control algorithms for single channel multicell networks have been extensively studied [1] , [2] , [3] . The monograph by Chiang et al. [4] and references therein provide an excellent survey of the area. Noncooperative games have been a natural tool for analysis and design of distributed power control algorithms. Scutari et al. [5] and Heikkinen [6] model distributed power control problems as potential games, while Altman & Altman [7] show that many of the cellular power control algorithms can be modeled as submodular games. In contrast, uplink resource allocation for multichannel multicell networks poses several challenges as observed in [2] and [8] .
We address the resource allocation problem in the uplink of a multichannel multicell network. Such a problem arises when a CDMA operator chooses to lease and utilize multiple frequency bands (channels) in order to reduce in-network interference, or multiple operators who lease different bands decide to cooperate. Many newer mobile devices are capable of operating over multiple CDMA bands, and thus have the option to choose from one of these distinct bands. We address a simplified version of this multichannel multicell problem where each BS operates on a separate frequency band, and so, there is no intercell interference.
A preview of our results is as follows. We propose a distributed algorithm for the combined base station association and power control problem, and subsequently model the problem as a player-specific congestion game. The equilibrium states of such algorithms, which are Nash equilibria of the corresponding games, may be far from system optimum. We resort to pricing mechanisms to induce mobiles to behave in a way that optimizes system cost. We also show that such a mechanism can be employed in a distributed fashion. Towards this end, we model the network as having a continuum of (nonatomic) mobiles, each offering infinitesimal load, which leads to a population game formulation. We then provide a marginal pricing mechanism that motivates a pricing strategy for the discrete mobiles case. Note that, unlike the case of transportation networks, mobiles are not really priced in cellular networks. The pricing is simply a part of the decision making routine built into each mobile in order bring about a distributed control mechanism that drives the system towards optimality.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we briefly discuss concepts of finite noncooperative games and population games. We study a network model with discrete mobiles in Section III. We propose a combined association and power control algorithm, model it as a noncooperative game, and analyze its performance. We extend this analysis to a network with a continuum of mobiles in Section IV. To address the inefficiency of the proposed algorithms, we design toll mechanisms in Section V. Finally, we conclude the paper with some remarks in Section VII. In Appendix A, we provide bounds on the price of anarchy [9] for the case of a continuum of mobiles. We omit a few of the proofs for lack of space; these can be found in our technical report [10] .
Optimal power allocation and BS association in uplinks of multichannel multicell cellular networks have not been explored before. Ours is an attempt at a detailed coverage on what is possible in general, with more specific results in some special cases. are Nash equilibria of the game. Thus all generalized ordinal potential games admit at least one Nash equilibrium. Since the games are finite (finite number of players and finite action sets), they also have the finite improvement path (FIP) property, i.e., do not contain improvement cycles [11, Lemma 2.3] . Thus, in a finite generalized ordinal potential game, when players update as per the better response strategy, round-robin or random update processes converge to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. With the same strategies, an asynchronous update process also converges [12, Ch. 5] .
II. GAME PRELIMINARIES

A. Finite Noncooperative Games
Remark 2.1: The strategic form games that have the FIP property also admit the finite best-response path (FBRP) property, i.e., they do not contain best response cycles [13, Sec. 5] . 1 Thus, if players update as per the best response strategy, then also the above update processes converge to a Nash equilibrium in a finite number of steps. The reverse implication is not true in general-the FBRP property need not imply the FIP property. Definition 2.3: Congestion Game: A game is said to be a player-specific weighted singleton congestion game if 1) there exists a set such that for all , and 2) there exist constants and nonincreasing functions such that 1 A best response cycle is a finite best response path such that , and for some , the deviating player in iteration strictly benefits [14] .
In the above definition, we interpret as a set of facilities and as the load offered by player . Then, denotes the total load on facility , under an action profile . The game is a singleton congestion game because each action picks exactly one facility. It is weighted because players offer different loads, and it is player-specific because the cost functions are player-specific.
Rosenthal [15] defined congestion games with unweighted players and player-independent cost functions, but more general action sets. The above generalization is due to Milchtaich [13] who showed that singleton weighted congestion games with player independent costs admit the FIP property but singleton player specific unweighted congestion games need not. Gairing et al. [16] studied these games in the special case of affine cost functions. Harks et al. [17] showed that a weighted congestion game admits a weighted potential function if and only if either all the cost functions are affine or they all are certain exponential functions. Mavronicolas et al. [18] considered a subclass of these games where each player-specific cost function is composed (by means of an abelian group operation) of a player-specific constant and a facility-specific nondecreasing function. Sbabou [19] considered another subclass for which all the Nash equilibria can be obtained without invoking the potential function or the finite best-reply property.
B. Population Games
A population game [20] consists of classes of nonatomic populations of players.
, and denotes the total mass of the class population. By a nonatomic population, we mean that the mass of each member of the population is infinitesimal. Players of class are associated with an action set . Actions of these (class ) players lead to an action distribution , where . All the players within a class are alike. Thus the action distributions completely specify the play; we can characterize the states and dynamics of play solely in terms of action distributions. Let denote the action distribution profile across the entire population, and let denote the set of all such profiles. A population is also accompanied by continuous cost density functions . [20, Prop. 3.1] . Any dynamics with positive correlation and noncomplacency (for e.g., the best response dynamics) approaches a Nash equilibrium [20] .
We are interested in nonatomic congestion games [20] in which , for a given set . As before, we interpret as a set of facilities. Moreover, each class has an associated offered load density . An action distribution profile leads to a congestion profile , where . The cost density functions depend on only through , and are increasing in .
C. Pricing
Levying of tolls is a conventional way to enforce system optimality in nonatomic networks. Beckman [21] and Dafermos & Sparrow [22] studied optimal tolls in transportation networks with a single class of users. Later Dafermos [23] and Smith [24] extended the analysis to multiclass networks. Roughgarden & Tardos [25] applied these ideas in computer networks and analyzed tolls for optimal routing.
In the atomic (discrete) setting, Caragiannis et al. [26] proposed tolls for two-terminal parallel-edge networks with unweighted users and linear latency functions. Subsequently, they considered the cases of heterogeneous users (with different sensitivities to taxes) and of asymmetric games where each client has at most two permissible choices [27] . Fotakis & Spirakis [28] studied cost balancing tolls for generic two-terminal networks with unweighted users and arbitrary increasing latency functions. Fotakis et al. [29] broadened this study to incorporate heterogeneous users and single-source multiple-sink networks. More recently, Jelinek et al. [30] analyzed the scenario where tolls have to respect some given upper bound restrictions on the links. They also focused on parallel-edge networks and unweighted users (either homogeneous or heterogeneous), and allowed arbitrary increasing latency functions. We propose an alternative toll mechanism, and demonstrate that the proposed tolls can be computed in a distributed fashion.
III. DISCRETE MOBILES
A. System Model
We now describe the model adopted in this work. We consider the uplink of a cellular network consisting of several BSs and mobiles. Each BS operates in a distinct frequency band. Let and denote the set of BSs and the set of mobiles, respectively.
A mobile must be associated with one BS at any time, and is free to choose the BS with which it associates. Let denote the power gain from mobile to BS . Let the receiver noise at all BSs have the average power . Let denote the power transmitted by mobile , and let be the BS to which it is associated. Under an association profile , let be the set of mobiles associated with BS . Under an association profile and a power vector , the signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of mobile at BS is Mobile has a target SINR requirement .
Remark 3.1:
Assume a scenario where the channels are close together relative to their centre frequencies. Then the channel gains for various mobile-BS pairs can be taken to be functions of distances between them. In particular, if all the mobiles (respectively, the BSs) are collocated, then the channel gains will depend on BSs' (respectively, the mobiles') indices (see Sections III-C2 and III-C3).
B. The MAPC Algorithm
Yates [2] and Hanly [3] proposed an algorithm for distributed association and power control in single channel cellular networks. Convergence results for the algorithm are based on the concept of a standard interference function. The technique is based on a mobile reassociating itself with a BS with which it needs to use the least power; this fails to work in the case of a multichannel network and analogous convergence results for this algorithm may not hold [2, Sec. VI]. Even in instances where the algorithm converges, it may get stuck at an association profile that is not Pareto efficient (see Definition 3.2) .
We propose an alternative distributed algorithm for combined BS association and power control in multichannel multicell cellular networks. We also show its convergence. We make use of the following simple fact (see, for example, [31, Ch. 5] ). Consider the subproblem of power control with a fixed association . Define , a measure of the "load" offered by mobile .
Proposition 3.1: For a fixed association , i) The power control subproblem of BS is feasible iff ; ii) If the power control subproblem of BS is feasible, there exists a unique efficient 2 power vector given by Throughout we assume that there exists at least one feasible association and power vector. Proposition 3.1 motivates the following algorithm.
Multichannel Association and Power Control (MAPC):
Mobiles switch associations in a round-robin fashion in accordance with the the optimal power consumptions (given by Proposition 3.1(ii)) at the BSs with which these associate. More precisely, a switching mobile associates with a BS where it would require the least power. As the load at a BS changes, it immediately broadcasts the new load, and the associated mobiles update their powers to the optimal required powers as per the new loads. Mathematically, define (1) where . For , mobile where updates its association and power at if . In this case,
and with (2b)
Remark 3.2:
Observe that while only one mobile updates its association at a time, all mobiles that perceive a change in load at their BSs update their powers to optimal values based on the new loads. If the power requirements of a mobile are identical at two or more BSs, one of those is chosen at random.
Remark 3.3:
Consider the special case where the mobiles have a common target SINR requirement. In this case, even if the algorithm starts with an infeasible association, selfish moves of players eventually lead to a feasible one, and updates remain feasible thereafter.
This algorithm is also distributed in nature as the one proposed in [2] . BS broadcasts its total congestion on a common control channel so that even non-associated mobiles receive this information. In addition, each mobile is told its scaled gains by each BS .
C. A Congestion Game Formulation
To show the convergence properties of the proposed algorithm, we model the system as a strategic form game. Let the mobiles be the players and the action set for each player be the possible associations, i.e., for all . Define the cost functions of the players to be for all . It can be seen that above is a player-specific singleton weighted congestion game, and belongs to the subclass of congestion games with multiplicative player-specific constants described in [18] . In the following we refer to it as the strategic form game . Before analyzing the general game, we consider the following special cases.
1) Single Class Traffic:
This is the case where all the mobiles have a common target SINR requirement . In this case, and we have a player specific unweighted singleton congestion game.
2) Collocated Mobiles: In this case, all mobiles are situated close together in a group. Thus for all , and
This yields a player independent weighted singleton congestion game.
3) Collocated BSs: Here all BSs are assumed to be situated close together. Thus for all , and
Now, we get a player specific weighted singleton congestion game.
The following result ensures that MAPC converges in each of these special cases.
Proposition 3.2:
The finite strategic form game is a generalized ordinal potential game and thus admits the FIP property in each of the following cases.
1) for all , 2) for all , 3) for all . Proof: In each case, we show that the game is better response equivalent [12, Ch. 5] to a generalized ordinal potential game (by demonstrating a potential function for the latter). This implies that, in each case, itself is a generalized ordinal potential game. It is also finite which implies that the FIP property holds. 1) Let us first observe that, in MAPC algorithm, mobiles do not switch to a BS if the new aggregate load of the BS exceeds (or equals) 1. Therefore, in any improvement path, if a BS's aggregate load becomes permissible (i.e., ), it continues to be below 1. After finitely many steps we get a partition of the set of BSs in two sets such that BSs in the first set have permissible loads while those in the second set do not, and mobiles do not switch across these sets (the latter set may be empty). Hence, to investigate the FIP property, we focus on the set of BSs with permissible load and on the mobiles associated with them. Alternatively, we assume that, after finitely many steps, all the BSs have permissible loads. Now note that the strategic form game is better response equivalent to
. Also note that
The function given by satisfies for all . Notice that all the product terms in the right hand side are strictly positive because all the BSs have permissible load. Thus the game is a generalized ordinal potential game with a potential function . 3 2) The strategic form game is better response equivalent to . Also note that So is a potential function for the game , and so the latter is a generalized ordinal potential game.
3) The strategic form game is better response equivalent to
The function defined as satisfies for all . Therefore
So the game is an generalized ordinal potential game with as a potential function. Now, we focus on the general case. Gairing et al. [16] show (via a counter-example with three players) that player-specific weighted singleton congestion games with affine cost functions are not necessarily generalized ordinal potential games, and so, need not possess the FIP property. This negative result applies to our game also, and convergence proofs based on potential functions cannot be used. However, it follows from [13] that the strategic form game admits (i) FIP property if , (ii) FBRP property if . Georgiou et al. [32] establish that player-specific weighted singleton congestion games with 3 players and linear cost functions possess FBRP property. Mavronicolas et al. [18] broaden this result to generic cost functions with player-specific constants. 4 Specifically, they show in an exhaustive manner that such games do not possess any best response cycles. 5 Their result and proof technique extend to the game even though the cost functions are not linear. Thus, the game can be shown to possess the FBRP property if . In the case of more than three players, convergence of the best response dynamics in weighted singleton congestion games with linear cost functions is an open problem [32] , [34] . Georgiou et al. [32] conjecture that such games always admit at least one NE. Though functions are not linear, the game is best response equivalent to another game in which costs are composed of multiplicative player-specific constants and affine nondecreasing functions. Also, simulations run on numerous instances of the game suggest that players' updates as per the best response strategy always converge in a finite number of steps. We therefore conjecture that Conjecture 3.1: The finite strategic form game admits the FBRP property and thus possesses at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
The FBRP property ensures that MAPC converges in a finite number of steps (see Remark 2.1). However, the round-robin update process requires some coordination to ensure that the designated mobile updates its association in a slot. Let us consider the following variants of MAPC.
1) Random update process: At each , one mobile is randomly chosen to update its association, while ensuring that all the mobiles have strictly positive probabilities of being chosen. In a framework with no synchronizing agent and with an arbitrarily fine time-scale, it is unlikely that two mobiles update simultaneously. Random update process is a natural candidate in this setup. 2) Asynchronous update process: At each , each mobile updates its association with probability . There is thus a strictly positive probability that any subset of mobiles may update their associations simultaneously. As before, all mobiles update their powers based on the new loads. This algorithm does not require any coordination among mobiles (to ensure one by one updates), and is thus fully distributed. The FBRP property of the game implies that these two algorithms also converge to a NE in finite number of steps with probability 1 (see Section II-A).
D. System Optimality
A system optimal power allocation should bring about the lowest interference environment. This motivates the following definition of system optimality.
Definition 3.1: For an association profile , define a system performance measure with defined in (1) . We define an association profile to be system optimal if it minimizes over all possible associations . Let us now recall the following notion of Pareto efficiency [31, Ch. 5] .
Definition 3.2:
An association profile is said to be Pareto dominated by another association profile if for all with for some . An association profile is said to be Pareto efficient if it is not Pareto dominated by any other association profile in . Clearly any association profile that is system optimal is also Pareto efficient. Thus, if there is a unique Pareto efficient association profile, it is also the unique system optimal one. However, unlike the case of single channel networks, joint association and power control problems in multichannel networks do not in general admit a unique Pareto efficient association profile. In particular, when , there cannot be unique Pareto efficient association profile. 6 To see this, define for any mobile as the set of best match BSs as follows:
The system optimal association profile is clearly Pareto efficient. Next, two cases are possible.
1) For all . Since , there exist two mobiles and such that . 2) There exists a mobile such that . Consider a mobile as in Case 1, or as in Case 2. Let be another profile which is system optimal subject to being associated with any of its best match BSs and no other mobile being associated with that BS. It can be easily checked that is also Pareto efficient.
As the following example illustrates, MAPC may settle at a Pareto inefficient association profile, and hence may not be system optimal.
Example 3.1: Consider a network with two BSs, two mobiles, and a common SINR requirement . The two BSs operate in disjoint bands. Assume
The unique Pareto efficient association is with power allocation . However, if we start with initial association , MAPC will not move forward, because a unilateral switch requires larger power to meet the target SINR. Neither mobile will switch to the BS with which it has a better channel. Hence, is a steady state power vector at which the algorithm settles; thus is Pareto inefficient.
In the following, we consider special cases, and investigate whether the proposed algorithm leads to a system optimal association profile. Proof: The mobiles as well as BSs are indistinguishable in this game. At a NE, let be the number of mobiles associated with BS . We first prove that at any NE, the vector of mobiles' costs is unique up to permutations. To prove this, it suffices to prove that the vector for a NE is unique up to permutations. As yields a NE, the following must hold for all (4) Define and . From (4) we see that given by characterizes one of the NEs; other NEs are permutations of this vector, and is unique up to permutations. We now show that is a system optimal congestion vector, and the system optimality of all other NEs follows. To do this observe that is a Schur-convex function in because is a convex function. This implies that the minimum value is attained at a vector which is as close to uniform as possible, i.e., a vector that is majorized by any other vector [35] . 8 All such vectors are permutations of (Alternatively, if there exist BSs and such that , moving a mobile from BS to BS results in a strictly lower cost). This concludes the proof.
IV. CONTINUUM OF MOBILES
In this section, we consider a nonatomic version of the system in Section III-A. Such a model is of interest for two reasons. First, for many of the fixed QoS traffic classes (e.g., voice), the target SINR requirements in CDMA cellular systems are very small. In a typical IS 95 CDMA system with system bandwidth 1.25 MHz, chip rate 1.2288 Mcps, data rate 9.6 Kbps, and target dB, the target SINR turns out to be dB, i.e., [31, Ch. 5 ]. If we assume that at any time the number of mobiles associated with a BS is large, it is reasonable to say that an incoming mobile or an outgoing mobile has a negligible effect on the congestion. Secondly, we have seen that our proposed algorithm may end up with inefficient associations. There is extensive work on toll mechanisms that induce system optimality in networks with a continuum of mobiles. The analysis 8 The condition for all is used to deduce that NE profiles are majorized by any non NE profile; the condition for all is used to deduce Schur-convexity of .
of toll-mechanisms (or pricing) on a multichannel multicell network with a continuum of mobiles can be expected to shed light on the existence and properties of pricing mechanisms for networks with discrete mobiles.
A. System Model
Let be an infinite set of classes of nonatomic mobiles. By nonatomic mobiles, we mean that the effect of a single mobile at a BS is infinitesimal. The population of class mobiles has "mass"
. All the mobiles in a class are collocated and require equal minimum SINR. In particular, all such mobiles have the same power gains to any of the BSs (gains from a mobile to different BSs can be different). Assume to be the finite set of BSs. As before, denotes the common standard deviation of receiver noise at all BSs. Let be the common minimum required SINR density for class mobiles, and be the power gain between a class mobile and BS . An association profile is a measurable function . Any association leads to a congestion profile being the mass of class mobiles associated with BS . Let denote the set of all such congestion profiles.
Under an association profile and a power density allocation , the SINR density for is Our definition of a "class" makes all the mobiles in a class alike, and so, congestion profiles are sufficient to characterize the system. In the sequel, we just use for for convenience. The dependence on is understood.
Consider again the subproblem of power control with a fixed congestion profile . The following result is analogous to Proposition 3.1, and is shown in [10, App. A].
Proposition 4.1:
1) The power control subproblem of BS is feasible iff . 2) If the power control subproblem of BS is feasible, there exists a unique efficient 9 power density given by such that , where is the underlying association profile. An evolutionary dynamics can be proposed to address the combined association and power control problem. To this end, we define functions , where denotes the minimum power density for class mobiles associated with BS under congestion profile , as For notational convenience, define
We then have (5) Again we assume that the system is feasible, i.e., there exists a feasible assignment, as done in Section III-B. This boils down to assuming in the case of nonatomic mobiles. Now, structures of the cost functions allow us to restrict attention to the region where ; if for a , all the mobiles associated with incur infinite cost.
B. A Congestion Game Formulation
We model the problem as a nonatomic congestion game. The continuum of mobiles constitute the population, and denotes the common action set for players of all the classes. Class players are accompanied by cost functions . In the following, we refer to it as the game .
Proposition 4.2:
The nonatomic game is a potential game. Furthermore, it admits at least one NE, and the set of NEs coincides with the set of minimizers of the potential function.
Proof: In the region , the function defined as (6) is a function with for all . Thus the nonatomic game is a potential game with as a potential function (see Definition 2.5). Note that the strategic form game is better response equivalent to . Thus the former is also a potential game with the same potential function . Now consider the following optimization problem: Clearly, , and hence is a positive semi-definite matrix. Thus, is a convex function of . Since we are minimizing a convex objective function subject to linear constraints, there exists at least one minimizer, and all minima are global minima. Also, Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions are necessary and sufficient [36, Sec. 5.5.3] . Combining this with the fact that NEs are the profiles which satisfy the Kuhn-Tucker first order conditions for a minimizer of the potential function (see Section II-B), we see that the set of NEs coincides with the set of minimizers of the potential function.
Remark 4.1: The assertion in the above proposition does not hold for general population games. While all local minimizers of potential function are equilibria, not all equilibria minimize potential (even locally) in general [20, Sec. 3] . This is unlike finite player potential games where only equilibria are the local minimizers of potential functions.
Furthermore, NEs have the following property [37, Prop. 3.3] .
Proposition 4.3:
The congestion at a BS is constant across all the NEs of the game . Consequently, the cost density for a class is also constant across all the NEs.
Remark 4.2: At NEs, the congestions (at BSs) by class, , are not unique because the objective function (6) is not strictly convex with respect to this set of variables.
C. System Optimality
Analogous to the definition in Section III-D, we define the system performance measure (9) A congestion profile is said to be system optimal if it minimizes over all possible profiles . In contrast with the discrete mobiles case where equilibria need not be Pareto efficient (see Example 3.1), we have the following result for the nonatomic case.
Proposition 4.4: All NEs of the nonatomic game are Pareto efficient. Proof: Let be a NE congestion profile. Under a NE, the cost densities for the mobiles of the same class are equal, irrespective of their associations (see Remark 2.2). Thus, it is sufficient to prove that there does not exist another congestion profile such that for every class , and for all BSs , with , (10) and strict inequality holds for some such and . Assume that such an exists. Then, where the last inequality follows because is a NE and . This yields . This further implies that there is a BS such that , and a class such that . By the strictly increasing property of , we have for a BS such that . Such a BS of course exists and the latter inequality follows because is a NE. The two inequalities imply , and so the tuple violates (10). Thus the assumption that Pareto dominates is incorrect. This completes the proof.
We show that the NEs are system optimal if all the mobiles are collocated, and all the BSs are symmetrically placed around them.
Proposition 4.5: All NEs in the nonatomic game , with for all , are system optimal. Proof: In the case of collocated base stations For the reason described earlier, we restrict attention to the region where . In this region, and so is a convex function of . Thus is a Schur-convex function of , and is minimized at any with for all . When for all , any congestion profile with equal congestion at all the BSs is a NE. Thus, the system optimal profile is a NE. Since all the NEs incur equal cost (see Proposition 4.3), all NEs are system optimal.
However, NEs need not be system optimal if BSs are not collocated, or mobile are not collocated. We illustrate these facts through the following examples.
Example 4.1: Consider an infinite set of nonatomic mobiles belonging to two classes; class 1 and class 2 mobiles have masses and respectively. Assume common minimum SINR density requirement , and let . Let there be two collocated BSs. Let the power gain between a class mobile and a BS be . A congestion profile is a NE if and only if it assigns equal load to both the BSs. Thus, the total cost incurred at NE Next, consider a profile in which class 1 mobiles associate with BS 1 and class 2 mobiles associate with BS 2. The cost incurred now is It can be easily checked that if
Example 4.2:
Consider an infinite set of nonatomic mobiles all belonging to same class;
. Assume common minimum SINR density requirement , and let . Let there be two BSs with the gain to BS , . An NE congestion profile is given as
On the other hand, a congestion profile will be system optimal if and only if solves the following optimization problem: (12) This is a convex optimization problem, and it is straightforward to show that
Hence, if , then , and and must satisfy (11) and (13) respectively. In such a case, the NE will be system optimal if and only if .
V. PRICING FOR SYSTEM OPTIMALITY
A. Continuum of Mobiles
In this section, we show that there is a toll mechanism that can induce system optimal associations and power allocations in a cellular network with multiple classes of mobiles. We also show that the mechanism can be employed in a distributed fashion. Define
Consider a congestion profile . We propose that a class mobile joining BS be levied a toll (14) Now, define , and consider the nonatomic game . Players may incur different power costs in different NEs of this game. Therefore, one has to distinguish between the following two cases [38] .
1) A toll mechanism is said to weakly enforce system optimality if some NE of the game with tolls is an optimal profile. 2) It is said to strongly enforce system optimality if all the NEs of the game with tolls are optimal profiles. We show that tolls weakly enforce system optimality in all cases and strongly enforce it in a special setting.
Proposition 5.1: The nonatomic game is a potential game. Furthermore, a congestion profile is system optimal only if it is a NE of this game.
Proof: See [10] . If all the mobiles are collocated, the proposed tolls strongly enforce system optimality. with given by (8a)-(8b). It is now obvious that is a positive semi-definite matrix, and so is a convex function of .
However, the tolls may fail to strongly enforce a system optimal congestion profile even if all the BSs collocated, the mobiles require a constant SINR density , but they are not collocated. To see this, consider the congestion profile with It can be easily checked that, for all which is independent of . Thus is a NE of the game . But may not be system optimal (see Example 4.1).
Remark 5.1: 1) can be interpreted as the marginal cost due to additional association of class mobiles to BS . The term is the power density incurred by these new mobiles, and is the increase in power consumption densities of the mobiles already associated with BS , integrated over all such mobiles. Economists call them "private cost" and "social cost", respectively. Selfish mobiles do not care for the social cost, while the social optimality criterion accounts for this marginal externality [39] .
2) The cost functions for various classes have a certain structure in the settings of interest to us. Mobile classes that consider a BS pay tolls proportional to their required SINR densities. In particular, tolls are uniform across all the mobile classes that have equal SINR requirements. This is special to our setting; usually one does not see uniform tolls in the case of multiclass networks (see Dafermos [23] , Smith [24] ).
This toll mechanism can be implemented in a distributed fashion. All the BSs broadcast the tolls (normalized by SINR densities) along with their aggregate congestions as before. 10 All mobiles need to know their scaled gains to each BS . A mobile then makes a choice taking both power density and toll into account.
B. Discrete Mobiles
Pricing mechanisms for networks with discrete mobiles are relatively difficult to design and analyze (Fotakis & Spirakis [38] ). Again, we propose a toll mechanism that weakly enforces system optimality in all cases and strongly enforces it in a special setting. The mechanism is motivated by the toll mechanism for the nonatomic case (Theorem 5.1).
Consider the network model of Section III-A and an association profile . Let mobile evaluate BS for association. Define . Analogous to the nonatomic case, define "private" and "social" costs as (15) respectively. 11 Clearly, is the required power of mobile if it joins BS , while is the aggregate increase in power 10 Normalized tolls are uniform across all mobile classes that consider a BS. A mobile can recover the exact toll from the normalized value. 11 In (15), when both terms within parentheses are , the expression is taken to be ; we may think of driving to the true values from below, and the first term always dominates the second. Same remark holds for other such expressions also.
consumption of all other mobiles associated with BS . We propose a toll mechanism with tolls given by (15) . This yields a new game with cost functions for an association profile given by (16) Proposition 5.3: The finite strategic form game is an ordinal potential game and thus admits the FBRP property.
Proof: See [10] . It is shown in [10] that the potential function equals the system performance measure defined in Section III-D. Hence an association profile that optimizes system performance is also a (global) minimizer of , and therefore a NE of the potential game with tolls. So, we see that tolls weakly enforce a system optimal association profile. In general, tolls do not strongly enforce a system optimal association profile. For instance reconsider Example 3.1. The association profile is inefficient, but an NE for the game . In the following we consider special cases, and investigate the effect of the proposed tolls.
1) Collocated Mobiles With Single Class Traffic:
Let us consider the special case when all the mobiles are collocated and have identical minimum SINR requirements. In other words, and for all . The potential function for this special case can be written as Define and for all . Then denotes the congestion profile under . Since mobiles are indistinguishable, any two association profiles that lead to identical congestion profiles are essentially indifferent from the point of view of analysis. Thus we talk solely in terms of congestion profiles. Abusing notation (the argument of was earlier defined to be the association profile ), we write Since is a finite potential game, an association profile will be a NE if and only if (17) for all . The following proposition shows that tolls strongly enforce a system optimal association profile in case of collocated mobiles with single class traffic.
Proposition 5.4: All the NEs in the game , with and for all , are system optimal. In other words, the tolls strongly enforce system optimality. Proof: Let be a system optimal congestion profile, and any other profile such that . Partition the set as such that
Start with the congestion profile , and move mobiles from BSs to BSs one mobile at a time, so that we end up with the congestion profile . In this process we get a succession of congestion profiles, each of which satisfies There must exist a pair of successive congestion profiles and such that , with possibly the ultimate congestion profile . Let be obtained from by the transfer of a mobile from BS to a BS . We then have which is same as (18) Recall that is a convex function and . Using these in (18), we get i.e., which implies that is not a NE (see (17) ). This completes the proof.
2) Collocated Mobiles and Symmetrically Placed BSs: Now we consider another special case when all the mobiles are collocated and all the BSs are symmetrically placed with respect to the collocated mobiles. In this case for all . We have the following result. Proposition 5.5: With for all , the NEs in the game coincide with those in . Proof: See [10] . Thus tolls may not strongly enforce a system optimal association profile in this case (see Example 3.4).
3) Collocated BSs With Single Class Traffic: Even in this special case tolls may fail to strongly enforce a system optimal association profile. For an illustration reconsider Example 3.3. The association profile is not system optimal, but an NE for the game . Remark 5.2: 1) While tolls at a BS are equal for all the mobiles not associated with it and having equal SINR requirements, they are mobile dependent for all associated ones (see (15) ). This is unlike in nonatomic case where we saw uniform tolls at a BS for all the mobiles with equal SINR requirements.
2) The modified algorithm (the one accounting for tolls) can be implemented in distributed fashion. All the BSs broadcast quantities given by along with their aggregate congestions . All the mobiles need to know the scaled gains of their own channels to all the BSs . Mobiles use these broadcast information to calculate their powers and tolls, and choose a BS taking both into account.
Discussion: The proposed pricing technique can be used to induce a system optimal routing in atomic weighted network congestion games with arbitrary nondecreasing edge latency functions [40] . 12 In this setting, the joint BS association and power control problems can be viewed as network congestion games over two-terminal parallel-edge networks: the edges are identified with BSs, and latencies are identified with minimum power requirements. It turns out that the proposed tolls weakly enforce a system optimal routing profile in general network congestion games. They strongly enforce a system optimal routing profile if 1) the network is two-terminal series parallel, 2) the mobiles are unweighted (i.e., have identical weights), and 3) the latency functions are standard. 13 
VI. SIMULATION
We now demonstrate the proposed joint BS association and power control algorithms via simulation. To illustrate, we consider a cellular network with 30 mobiles and 3 BSs (thus leading to possible association profiles). The BSs use mutually noninterfering channels (see Fig. 2 ). The mobiles are scattered independently and uniformly. We take the channel gains to be equal to the path losses which are assumed to follow the inverse square law. More precisely, for any mobile and BS that are a distance apart,
The receiver noise at any BS has the average power 0.1 mW. The target SINRs s are independently and uniformly sampled from the interval [0.05, 0.1] for all . Thus and , which is necessary for feasibility of the joint BS association and power control problem at hand.
We start with an arbitrary association and consider the random update process, wherein at each iteration a randomly chosen mobile updates, with all mobiles equally likely to be chosen. We have implemented MAPC (proposed in Section III-B) and also its variant with tolls as described in Section V-B. We plot the aggregate power over all the mobiles in Fig. 1 . The initial BS association is infeasible and so are a few subsequent ones, resulting in infinite transmit powers in the 12 Here, the system cost is weighted sum of the latencies of all the mobiles. 13 A latency function is called standard if is convex [39] , e.g., . first few iterations. But the proposed algorithms quickly lead to feasible associations and power allocations. This is evident from Fig. 1 where we observe finite aggregate transmit powers after first few iterations. The proposed algorithms also quickly converge to equilibrium BS associations (NEs in the respective games). Notice that we have simulated the most general case for which MAPC's convergence has not been formally established. The demonstrated convergence of MAPC corroborates Conjecture 3.1. While the equilibrium associations of these algorithms need not be system optimal, they are seen to substantially reduce the aggregate power compared to an arbitrary association. Also recall that aggregate transmit power acts as a potential function for the game in Section V-B (Proposition 5.3). Therefore, the aggregate power for MAPC with tolls decreases after each iteration and settles at a local minimum (see Fig. 1 ).
Finally, we show the steady state associations for both the algorithms in Fig. 2 . We observe that a few mobiles (6 mobiles in Fig. 2 ) may associate with different BSs under the two algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSION
We studied the combined association and power control problem in multichannel multicell cellular networks in which a different channel is used by each cell, and so, there is no intercell interference. We studied the cases of discrete mobiles and a continuum of mobiles. We proposed several distributed mechanisms motivated by the techniques of game theory. We studied the inefficiency of the distributed algorithm in the case of a continuum of mobiles. It is an open question whether such inefficiency can be quantified in the case of discrete mobiles. To mitigate the inefficiency, we proposed toll mechanisms in both the settings.
APPENDIX A PRICE OF ANARCHY: CONTINUUM OF MOBILES
Recall that a NE is not necessarily a system optimal congestion profile (see Example 4.2). Price of anarchy [9] (or, Coordination ratio [41] ) characterizes the inefficiency caused by the selfish behavior of players; it is the ratio of the cost of the worst NE and the optimal cost. We observed in Proposition 4.3 that, in the nonatomic case, mobiles incur the same cost at all the NEs. We can then define price of anarchy as follows.
Definition A.1: Let be a NE, and be a system optimal congestion profile. Then the price of anarchy is We restrict our analysis to a single class population. We assume that all the mobiles have identical minimum required SINR density and identical power gain to BS .
A. Two BSs
First we consider a case with 2 BSs as in Example 4.2. Let . 14 Also, let and be the congestion profiles under a NE and a system optimal association, respectively. Recall from Example 4.2 that 1) if , then
2) if , then , and from (13) 3) if , then from (11) and is as above. and are obtained via substituting and , respectively, in the objective function (12) . Straightforward calculations give the equation shown at the bottom of the 14 If equal fraction of population join each of the BSs under the NE and the system optimal association, and the price of anarchy is 1. page, where . Further calculations also yield that is continuous at , and
Thus, the price of anarchy is maximized when . Moreover, the maximum price of anarchy is
Viewing this now as a function of , we see that the maximum price of anarchy decreases with . We also observe that as , i.e., arbitrarily high PoAs can be realized in 2 BS networks.
B. BSs
Again, without any loss of generality, we assume that . We also assume that the population's mass is when it spills over BS under NE. Clearly, . In the case of 2 BSs we proved that price of anarchy is maximized when the population spills over BS 2 under NE. In the case of BSs also, simulations suggest that the price of anarchy is maximized at one of the spill over points . We have however not been able to prove this observation. We illustrate this observation in [10, Fig. 1 ].
However, we prove that the price of anarchy decreases with mass for . We define and . It can be easily checked that, for , from which the claim follows (see [10, App. B] for details). Thus, to obtain a bound on the price of anarchy, we only focus on . For , the load on BS under NE. We use this observation in the next section.
C. A Bound on the Price of Anarchy
Now, we derive a sharp bound on the price of anarchy for single class networks with arbitrary number of BSs, and gains for all the BSs. We follow [39, Ch. 3] .
In the BS association game, a generic cost function is of the form and is the class of all feasible cost functions. Observe that the functions and the class both are standard. 15 We define
We also assume that the load on a BS with gain does not exceed under NE. Thus, we redefine anarchy value for a cost function as 16 where satisfies and . Both and are functions of ; we do not show this dependence explicitly. Straightforward calculations yield that
The anarchy value for class is (see [39, Def. 3 [39] . 16 The original definition ( [39] , Definition 3.3.2) considers supremum over .
